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In the past a number of studies were conducted in order to meas-
ure agricultural protection. The predominating result was that
industrial countries strongly protect their domestic producers,
whereas developing countries in most cases tend to tax agricul-
ture (Schultz [1978], Peterson [1979], Bale and Lutz [1981]). An
opposite outcome was obtained by Byerlee and Sain [1986], who did
not detect a systematic discrimination against wheat producers in
developing countries. Another branch of the literature was con-
cerned with the identification of factors that might determine
the observed protection levels. Anderson, Honma and Hayami [1986]
as well as Honma and Hayami [1986] consider the comparative ad-
vantage of agriculture, the relative share of agriculture in
national economy and the international terms of trade between the
agricultural and the industrial sector to be major explanatory
variables for agricultural price protection. Herrmann [1989]
explains varying protection levels in the wheat market by differ-
ences in economic development and import-dependence.
In this paper the variables of these studies are combined in
order to elaborate the determinants of protection for another
important agricultural product, namely rice . In the first in-
stance, protection coefficients have to be calculated, because
appropriate data for regression analysis are not yet available.
The objective then is to investigate, whether the econometric
performance of the model can be improved by extending the set of
explanatory variables to overcome a possible misspecification due
to omitted variables. Furthermore, a comparison of the results
for rice with those obtained in previous studies is intended.
Also information will be given about the sensitivity of estimates
in the presence of differently measured protection coefficients.
The analysis is conducted within a pooled cross-country and time
series approach. In line with recent studies dummy variables
(intercept dummies as well as slope dummies) are introduced in
order to account for possible structural differences betweencountries and subperiods. As a measure of agricultural price
policies serves the Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC) , with
three alternatives to be considered: Firstly, the NPC is calcula-
ted traditionally as the ratio of domestic to border prices.
Secondly, a factor correcting for exchange rate distortions is
included to account for indirect effects on agricultural protec-
tion resulting from general trade policy (e.g. exchange rate
policy). Such indirect effects are significant and may even be
stronger than the direct effects (World Bank [1986]), Krueger,
Schiff and Valdes [1988]). Thirdly, the existence of concessional
imports within food-aid programmes is taken into account (Taylor
[1989]).
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a survey
of the structure of protection levels in different country groups
and subperiods. In section III the hypotheses on the determinants
of protection are formulated and the data used in the analysis
are described. The sample is divided into a group of net-import-
ing and a group of net-exporting countries, because one would
expect government authorities to behave differently in either
case, emphasizing self-sufficiency goals in the first and tax
revenues or the maintenance of world market shares in the second
situation. Section IV contains the empirical evidence. A pooled
cross-section and time series approach is applied for 17 net-
importing countries (subsection IV.1.) and 13 net-exporting coun-
tries (subsection IV.2.), covering the time period from 1969 to
1980 . Finally, the major findings are summarized.
II. Survey of Protection Levels for Different Country Groups and
Subperiods
In the first instance, NPCs were calculated as the ratio of do-
mestic to border prices (adjusted for internal transportation
costs) for 30 countries and 12 years. After that, these NPCs were
corrected for exchange rate distortions and concdessional im-
ports, respectively. A detailed list of the differently calcu-
lated NPCs is shown in the Appendices 1 to 3. In order to give an
impression of the distribution of NPCs across countries and overTable 1 - Nominal Protection Coefficients (NPCs) for Rice by-
























































The net-exporting countries included are: Egypt, Burma, Nepal,
Pakistan, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Japan, USA,
Australia, Italy, Spain. The net-importing countries included
are: Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sene-
gal, Tanzania, Zambia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Korea
.(Rep.), Philippines, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Mexico.
All NPCs are unweighted averages. - Adjusted for exchange
rate distortions by application of the following formula: NPC *
black market exchange rate/official exchange rate (US$ per home
currency). - Adjusted for exchange rate distortions and con-
cessional imports. The latter adjustment procedure is described
in footnote 7. -
 eUSA, Australia, Italy, Spain. - Korea, Ma-
laysia, Turkey, Mexico.
Source: Data are taken from Appendices 1-3.time, the data on protection levels are summarized in Table 1.
Irrespective of the calculation procedure both subsamples show
NPCs below unity on average, thus indicating a negative overall
protection level for the rice sector. NPCs were above average
from 1970 to 1972 and below average during the world food crisis
in 1974 and 1975. In developing countries the unadjusted protec-
tion coefficients (NPCL) were substantially higher than those
adjusted for exchange rate distortions (NPC2), because their
currencies were overvalued on average. Within the group of devel-
oping countries one can observe enormous differences in exchange
rate policies. On the one hand, the sample includes countries
like Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Senegal, who fixed their curren-
cies to the Franc and thereby avoided major distortions, or like
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia who also had rather undistorted
exchange rates during the period considered here. On the other
hand, in some countries (e.g. the socialist countries Tanzania,
Zambia and Burma) the official rate partly exceeded the black
market rate (both measured in US$ per home currency) by more than
100 per cent thus indicating a strong overvalution.
Most striking among the net exporters is the extraordinarily high
protection level in Japan. In contrast, the other industrial
countries did not support domestic producers (the average NPC
being slightly below unity) and the developing countries apart
from Brazil taxed rice exports.
Within the subsample of net importers only the governments of the
higher-income countries applied policies in favor of domestic
farmers. Furthermore, NPCs adjusted for food aid receipts as well
as for exchange rate distortions appeared to be similar to unad-
justed NPCs. This might be explained by the fact that countries
with overvalued currencies often at the same time depended on
concessional imports. Since concessional imports are cheaper than
commercial imports, they lower border prices and thereby raise
the actual level of protection. Thus, both adjustment procedures
tend to offset each other.III. Hypotheses and Data Base
NPCs of net-importing countries are supposed to be determined by
economic development, import-dependence, the relative share of
agriculture in total economy and the international terms of trade
between food and industrial goods. In detail the causalities can
be depicted as follows:
1. The level of protection is assumed to increase with advances
in economic development as measured by GDP per capita. Both
Balisacan/Roumasset [1987] and Herrmann [1989] confirm this
view for a bundle of major grains and for wheat, respective-
ly. Herrmann argues that industrialized countries are more
able to separate their domestic agricultural sector from
world market conditions in order to reach distributional
goals, because they do not face the strong budgetary con-
straints existing in most developing countries.
Balisacan and Roumasset explain the relationship between
agricultural protection and economic development within a
public choice framework, which is based on a model establish-
ed by Becker [1983]. They divide interest groups into propo-
nents (agricultural producers) and opponents (urban consumers
and industrial producers) of agricultural protection. On the
one hand, farmer's investment in lobbying activities rise as
the economy grows. This is due to falling coalition costs in
the presence of improved basic services like transportation
and communication facilities combined with the concentration
of agricultural production. Lower costs in turn mean higher
net benefits of lobbying. On the other hand, investment of
consumers and industrialists in opposition to agricultural
protection falls as economic development proceeds. Since
budget shares for food expenditures decrease as income rises
(Engel's law), consumer welfare becomes less sensitive to
changes in food prices. Similarly, industrialist's profits
become less sensitive to wages (which may be linked to food-
crop prices), because wages make up a smaller share of pro-
duction costs in view of rising capital intensity.The same analytical framework can be applied to explain the
relationship between agricultural protection and agricul-
ture's share in the economy: As the number of farmers de-
creases, it becomes easier for them to organize lobbying
activities. Concurrently, a growing non-agricultural sector
lowers the burden of agricultural protection per capita of
the non-agricultural population, thereby reducing their re-
sistence against protective measures.
Although GDP per capita and agriculture's share in the econo-
my are likely to be (negatively) correlated, it is left to
the empirical analysis, whether one or the other variable
should be omitted because of multicollinearity problems.
2. Most of the rice importers tried to reduce their import-de-
pendence during the 1970s and 1980s. The striving for self-
sufficiency has been a major political goal above all in
4
Asia, where rice is the basic food-crop (World Bank [1986]) .
It seems reasonable to assume that major objectives of gov-
ernments in developing countries concerning rice policies are
to offer cheap rice to the politically influential urban
consumers and at the same time to raise the share of domesti-
cally produced rice. This would force governments (or, more
precisely, the marketing boards that are engaged in the dis-
tribution of rice) to buy rice at high prices from domestic
farmers in order to create production incentives and to sell
it at low prices to consumers. Such a combination of producer
price supports and consumer subsidies leads to high budgetary
costs. The ability of government authorities to protect do-
mestic farmers thus depends on the expenditures needed to
guarantee a given (low) level of consumer prices. This costs
in turn are the higher the more rice is produced domestical-
ly, i.e. protection levels are supposed to be positively
(negatively) related to import shares (the degree of self-
sufficiency) .
3. Finally, one would expect that the international terms of
trade between agricultural and industrial products are in-
versely related to the protection level. An illustrative ex-ample supporting this view is the strong increase in agricul-
tural prices relative to industrial prices during the world
food crisis in 1974 and 1975, which corresponded with falling
NPCs. This phenomenon can be explained by a general tendency
of policy makers to stabilize producer prices (or real farm
income, respectively) in the presence of unstable world mar-
ket prices .
Since rice prices are more likely moving parallel to other
food-crop prices than to agricultural prices as a whole, in
this study the international terms of trade between food (in-
stead of total agricultural products) and manufactured goods
are introduced as a potential explanatory variable for price
protection in the rice sector.
With one exception the above hypotheses are also put forward in
the case of net-exporting countries. Only the foreign trade posi-
tion is now depicted by export shares instead of import-depend-
ence. For this variable the argument is as follows:
4. Firstly, a large agricultural sector, which is typical for
developing countries, is the main source of government reve-
nues. Consequently, one would expect decreasing NPCs (i.e.
more and more taxation of exports due to budget considera-
tions) as export shares rise. Secondly, developing countries,
that hold high world market shares, tax exports trusting in
their putative monopoly power in world trade (World Bank
[1986]). This adds to the assumption of a negative correla-
tion between agricultural protection and export shares. On
the other side, industrial countries do not strongly depend
on tax revenues from agriculture (especially in the case of
rice) and therefore are in a position to defend their high
export shares (except Japan, where domestic demand for rice
makes up a high proportion of production) through application
of export promoting measures. Altogether, the sign of the
partial derivative is not determined a priori.
Formally, the foregoing considerations can be summarized within
the following implicit functions:(1) NPCj = f(GDP, IMPDEP, AGRSH, TOT)
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NPC stands for the nominal protection coefficient of rice, the
subscripts I and E characterize net-importing and net-exporting
countries, respectively, GDP is GDP per capita based on pur-
chasing power parities, IMPDEP import-dependence in rice, AGRSH
agriculture's share in total economy, TOT the international terms
of trade between food and manufactured goods and finally, EXPSH
indicates the export share of rice.
NPCs are measured as the ratio between domestic rice prices and
border prices, the latter being regarded as the opportunity costs
facing domestic producers. The data used are prices received by
farmers (FAO [1982]), which are converted into US Dollars at
official exchange rates, and per unit prices for exports and
imports calculated from FAO Trade Statistics. Import prices in-
clude cost, insurance and ocean freight (c.i.f. prices) to the
local port, whereas export prices are free on board (f.o.b. pri-
ces) at the local port. Since producer prices and border prices
should be brought to a single marketing point in order to be
comparable (Westlake [1987]), one has to carry out an adjustment
for internal transportation costs . Data are taken from Taylor
[1989] and for the industrial countries of the sample, which are
not included in the Taylor-study, information about major produc-
tion regions is obtained from The World Atlas of Agriculture
[1973]. NPCs adjusted for exchange rate distortions are calcula-
ted by multiplying the protection coefficient by the ratio of the
published black market rate (Cowitt [1985], Pick [1978]) to the
official exchange rate (IMF [1981]). Additionally, for net-im-
porting countries NPCs are computed by adjusting c.i.f. import
prices for concessional imports as reported in FAO [1984]. Data
on real GDP per capita based on purchasing power parities aretaken from the International Comparison Project (Summers and
Heston [1988]).
Import-dependence is defined as rice imports divided by the sum
of rice imports and rice production. The export share is the
ratio between exported and produced rice quantities. Both vari-
ables are introduced one-year lagged to avoid a simultaneity bias
in the estimation, which would occur otherwise, because imports
and exports as well as production are definitely influenced by
varying protection levels. Data on these quantities are available
from FAO Trade and Production Yearbooks. Since rice production is
reported in paddy units, it is transformed into rice units by
applying the standard conversion factor 0.65 (1 paddy unit = 0.65
rice units). The share of agriculture in the national economy is
measured by agriculture's share in total economically active
population as reported in the FAO Production Yearbook. Alterna-
tively, one could use agriculture's share in gross domestic prod-
uct. Since time series data on this variable are not completely
available, it is not applied here. Finally, the international
terms of trade between food and manufactured goods are specified
as the ratio of the index of world export unit value of food (FAO
Trade Yearbook) and the world export unit value index for manu-
factured goods in market economies (UN Statistical Yearbook) with
the 1970 value set equal to 100.
IV. Empirical Results
In this section, estimates referring to the above equations are
reported separately for net-importing and net-exporting coun-
tries. The model was specified linearly, because the linear model
outperformed a loglinear version in most cases. The results were
obtained within a multiple regression analysis by application of
the ordinary least squares (OLS) method to the pooled time series
and cross-section data. Alternatively, the equations were esti-
mated (i) without introducing dummy variables, (ii) making solely
use of intercept dummies and (iii) including both, intercept and
slope dummies.10
IV.1. Determinants of Protection in Net-importing Countries
The sample consists of 17 developing countries (see Table 1) and
covers a period of 12 years, thus amounting to 204 observations.
In order to account for structural differences between various
countries and subperiods, dummy variables were constructed
according to the following observable peculiarities:
i) Developing countries with higher income (Korea, Malaysia,
Turkey, Mexico) protect domestic farmers more than less
developed countries. This argument is much in line with the
empirical findings for the Asian newly industrialized coun-
tries by Herrmann [1989] and Anderson, Hayami and Honma
[1986].
ii) Low world market prices for rice in the years 1970 to 1972
imply a low denominator of the NPC. If governments tend to
stabilize producer prices, as was assumed in chapter III,
this leads to NPCs which are above average.
iii) Finally, a similar argument holds true for the period of the
world food crisis, which caused extremely high world market
prices for agricultural commodities, especially in 1974 and
1975. Therefore, NPCs should be below average in this years.
Econometric estimates based on differently calculated NPCs and
different compositions of structural and qualitative explanatory
variables are summarized in the Tables 2, 3 and 4.
Table 2 contains the results obtained by regressing the conven-
tional NPC, which only reflects direct agricultural price poli-
cies, on the exogenous variables of the model. The first column
of the table reveals that economic development as measured by GDP
per capita significantly accounted for variations in NPC, the
t-value of 6.8 indicating a coefficient different from zero even
at the 0.1 significance level. However, the coefficient is quite
low. The result for the influence of import-dependence on protec-11
Table 2 - Determinants of Rice Price Protection with Unadjusted





















































































NPC is defined as the ratio of domestic and border prices cor-
rected for internal transportation costs. Value in parantheses
are t-values. R
2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination, F
is the F-value and DF indicates the degrees of freedom. - Dl to
D3 are defined in the text.
* (**) statistically different from zero at the 10% (1%) signi-
ficance level.
Source: Own computations based on data given in the Appendix.12
tion entirely contradicts the theoretical considerations. No
significant causal connection could be detected and the sign was
even negative as opposed to the postulate of a positive relation-
ship.
These results confirm those for the wheat sector obtained by
Herrmann [1989] , if one is - only looking at the unquestionably
positive relationship between economic development and protection
levels. Referring to import-dependence, there is no consistency
between both commodities. This might originate from the different
composition of the samples in both studies. Whereas in the case
of wheat industrialized as well as developing countries were
included, the net rice importers considerd here are exclusively
developing countries. Industrialized countries are more likely
applying foreign trade measures (e.g. import tarifffs or quantity
restrictions) in order to raise the degree of self-sufficiency,
because they do not give priority to low consumer prices. Policy
makers in developing countries in turn have to provide cheap food
and therefore are supposed to prefer domestic measures like
consumer subsidies and price supports for farmers. However, the
latter measure was not observable on average (see Table 1). Since
some countries with low producer prices (India, Indonesia,
Philippines) nevertheless were successful in their striving for
self-sufficiency, this must be due to other incentives than price
supports, which cannot be covered by the NPC (e.g. fertilizer
subsidies). Other countries probably gave priority to the
provision of cheap food and could not at the same time pursue the
self-sufficiency goal, because budget constraints were too
severe.
Apart from the insignificant coefficient of import-dependence the
R
2 value was unsatisfactory low in regression (1). Since this
might be due to omitted variables, agriculture's share in total
economy and the international terms of trade between food and
manufactured goods were introduced as additional explanatory var-
iables. As regression (2) reports, the R
2 value was slightly
raised from 0.19 to 0.25. The results for both variables confirmBfbffothek
13 dm fnstrtuts fur WeJtwirtschafl
the theoretical hypotheses, but the coefficient of the former was
not significant , whereas the coefficient of the latter was sta-
Q
tistically different from zero at the 0.1 significance level .
The consideration of intercept dummies in regression (3) raised
the R
2 to 0.35, a size, which is in line with the results ob-
tained by other authors for samples consisting of developing
countries. The surprising outcome then was that all structural
explanatory variables did not account for variations in NPCs,
whereas the qualitative variables were significant at least at
the 10% level. The coefficient of the intercept dummy Dl, repre-
senting the higher-income countries within the sample (Korea,
Malaysia, Turkey, Mexico), suggests that rice protection in these
countries exceeded the level in the other countries by more than
50 percentage points. Dl was highly correlated with GDP per ca-
pita (the correlation coefficient being 0.86); therefore one can
conclude that the positive coefficient of GDP per capita in re-
gression (2) is mainly due to the weight of the higher income
countries, which is underlined by the insignificant coefficient
of that variable in regression (3). D2, which characterizes the
low world market prices for rice in the years 1970 to 1972, re-
veals that in this subperiod the protection level of rice ex-
ceeded the one in the other years significantly. The dummy D3,
which stands for the commodity price boom during the world food
crisis, indicates NPCs being significantly lower in 1974 and 1975
than in the other years. D3 was highly correlated with the inter-
national terms of trade between food and industrial goods (the
correlation coefficient being 0.84), that is to say, the signi-
ficance of the latter in regression (2) was mainly caused by its
particularly high values in 1974 and 1975, which corresponded to
low NPCs.
Summarizing the information of regression (3), rice price protec-
tion levels were above average in higher-income developing coun-
tries as well as from 1970 to 1972 and below average during the
world food crisis. Apart from this structural peculiarities the
econometric analysis does not provide any explanatory power so
far. The additional consideration of slope-dummies (Regression 4)14
did not improve the estimates substantially. Since this was the
case in all regressions, the respective results are not reported
for the remainder of the paper.
Table 3 summarizes the regression results with differently calcu-
lated NPCs serving as left-hand variables. In all three cases the
model specification including intercept dummies was chosen as the
best alternative. The second column of Table 3 presents the esti-
mate, which was obtained, when the NPC adjusted for exchange rate
distortions was used as a dependent variable. In this case the
corrected coefficient of determination was substantially raised,
the R
2 value being 0.48. This improvement is caused by a closer
relationship between GDP per capita and the protection coeffi-
cient (the t-value was 1.32 as compared to -0.30 in the case of
the unadjusted NPC). The rise in significance of the income-var-
iable in turn can be explained by the fact that particularly
lower developed countries are known to have strongly distorted
exchange rates, which was for example true for Tanzania and Zam-
bia, whose adjusted NPCs were much lower than the unadjusted ones
during the sample period.
On the other hand, one can conclude from Table 3 that the consi-
deration of the effects of overvalued exchange rates on protec-
tion levels did not change the structure of the econometric re-
sults. As in the case of unadjusted NPCs the qualitative var-
iables Dl to D3 explained variations in protection at the expense
of the structural variables. Even the coefficient of GDP per
capita was not significant.
Finally, the third column of Table 3 comprises the estimates,
which were obtained, when NPCs adjusted for exchange rate distor-
tions as well as concessional imports were regressed on the usual
explanatory variables. The R
2 values was similar to the value
reported in column 1 and lower than that in column 2. This can be
explained as follows: concessional imports are much cheaper than
commercial imports, thereby raising the actual protection level
in the food-aid receiving countries via falling border prices,
whereas corrections for overvalued exchange rates lower the NPC.15
Table 3 - Sensitivity Analysis of the Estimates in the Presence of
















































































2, F and DF are defined in Table 2.
* (**) statistically different from zero at the 10% (1%) signi-
ficance level.
Source: Own computations based on data given in the Appendix.16
Under the assumption that both concessional imports and exchange
rate distortions coincide in many less developed countries, these
two adjustment procedures should tend to offset each other.
Again, the estimates revealed no structural differences compared
with the cases analyzed before, that is to say, the estimates for
net rice importing countries are robust in the presence of dif-
ferently measured NPCs. In all three cases variations in protec-
tion levels can only be explained by structural peculiarities.
IV.2. Determinants of Protection in Net-exporting Countries
The present sample contains 13 countries, splitting up into 8
developing and 5 developed countries. With a time series length
of 12 years the sample includes 156 observations. Analogously to
the preceding subsection a couple of dummy variables have to be
specified in order to account for structural differences across
countries and over time:
i) As in the case of net-importing countries time-variations in
parameters were likely to prevail in the years 1970 to 1972
and during the world food crisis. The corresponding dummies
are called D4 and D5, respectively.
ii) It is often mentioned in the literature and shown in Table 1
that Japan protects its domestic farmers more strongly than
most other countries. The dummy D6 is constructed to take
into account this peculiarity.
iii) An additional dummy D7, which represents the industrial
countries except Japan (USA, Australia, Italy, Spain), re-
flects the fact that developed countries generally tend to
protect their agricultural sectors, whereas developing coun-
tries tax particularly export-crops in order to raise reve-
nues (see e.g. World Bank [1986]).17
Estimates based on different combinations of structural and qua-
litative explanatory variables are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 contains the results, which were obtained by making use
of unadjusted NPCs as dependent variables. The model specifica-
tion without dummy variables provides an R
2-value of 0.46, which
is acceptable given the standards of a cross-section analysis.
The coefficient of GDP per capita was positive and strongly
significant as theory suggests. Export-shares, the coefficients
of which were not determined a priori, were negatively related to
protection levels. The inverse relationship results from the
following peculiarities: Firstly, developing countries with high
export shares {like Thailand) tax rice exports substantially (see
e.g. World Bank [1985]). Secondly, Japan has low export shares,
which correspond to extremely high protection levels. And third-
ly, the industrial countries with high export shares (USA, Au-
stralia, Italy) do not systematically promote rice exports to
defend world market shares. As in the case of net-importing coun-
tries agriculture's share in total economy did not significantly
account for variations in protection. A possible reason is multi-
collinearity: the correlation coefficient between agriculture's
share in economy and GDP per capita was 0.85 . Thus, the var-
iable is eliminated from the analysis for the remainder of this
chapter. According to theory, the coefficient of the internatio-
nal terms of trade between food and industrial goods was negative
and different from zero at the 1 per cent significance level.
Regression (2) reports the estimates which were obtained after
the omission of agriculture's share in economy. The R
2-value
remained unchanged and the coefficients only marginally differ
from those in regression (1), but the F-value rose noticeably.
The introduction of intercept-dummies caused an enormous increase
in the corrected coefficient of determination from 0.46 to 0.73.
Such a high explanatory power is very satisfactory in the pre-
sence of cross-section data. The coefficients of GDP per capita
and export shares were still significant at the 1 per cent level,
although the t-values were somewhat lower than before. As in the18






































































2, F and DF are defined in Table 2. - D4-D7 are defined in the
text.
* (**) statistically different from zero at the 10% (1%) signi-
ficance level.
Source: Own computations based on data given in the Appendix.19
foregoing subsection the international terms of trade between
food and manufactured goods were highly correlated with the cor-
responding intercept-dummy D5 (the correlation coefficient being
0.88) and therefore became insignificant. Two of the qualitative
variables were different from zero at the 1 per cent level. D4
indicates that protection levels were higher in the years 1970 to
1972 than in the other years. Moreover, from the Japan dummy D6,
which mainly contributed to the increasing R
2-value, can be de-
rived that Japan's nominal protection coefficient was very much
higher than in the other countries, by more than 150 percentage
points. Herrmann [1989] obtained nearly the same result for the
wheat sector. The insignificance of D7 is due to the fact that
none of the industrial countries (except Japan) applied price
policies in favor of domestic rice producers during the 1970s.
Turning to the case of NPCs adjusted for exchange rate distor-
tions, one again (as in the previous subsection) does not observe
any fundamental changes. As regression (1) in Table 5 documents,
all coefficients were significant and had the same sign as in the
presence of unadjusted NPCs. The R
2- and F-value were slightly
increased due to a closer relationship between GDP per capita and
protection levels, which can in turn be explained by the fact
that only developing countries (here particularly Burma and
Egypt) had strongly overvalued exchange rates during the sample
period. The same reason was responsible for the dummy D7 to be
significant in regression (2). The adjusted NPCs (as opposed to
the unadjusted ones) were significantly higher in industrial than
in developing countries.
Altogether, the empirical performance of the model for net rice
exporting countries is much better than that for net-importing
countries, which might partly be due to the fact that the sample
includes industrial as well as developing countries. As in the
case of net-importing countries the structure of the econometric
results was not changed by differently measured NPCs. The adjust-
ment for exchange rate overvaluations only slightly improved the
estimates in terms of the R
2- and F-value.20
Table 5 - Determinants of Rice Price Protection with NPCs Adjusted


















































2, F and DF are defined in Table 2.
* (**) statistically different from zero at the 10% (1%) signi-
ficance level.
Source: Own computations based on data given in the Appendix.21
V. Summary and Maior Findings
The main objectives of this study were
to quantify the extent of agricultural price differentials for
one important food crop, rice, for a cross-section of coun-
tries, and
to identify economic (budgetary) as well as political factors
underlying agricultural protectionism in net-exporting and
net-importing countries, respectively.
Nominal protection coefficients for rice for 30 countries cover-
ing the period 1969-80 were calculated first. Subsequently, free
or black market exchange rates were used to adjust nominal pro-
tection coefficients in order to reflect the indirect effects of
price distortions resulting from macroeconomic policies. For the
17 net-importing countries an additional set of NPCs was produced
by including the price effects brought about by concessional
imports.
The major findings of this part of the study are:
1. On average, domestic producer prices were below border price
equivalents, thus indicating a discrimination of domestic
farmers.
2. If exchange rate overvaluations are taken into account, price
discrimination is, on average, higher in net-exporting than in
net-importing countries. However, indirect price discrimina-
tion is partly offset by concessional imports in net-importing
countries. As a result, exporters are ultimately discriminated
more heavily than importers.
The calculated NPCs were then used in the econometric analysis of
the determinants of rice price protection. Summarizing the esti-
mates for net-importing countries, one can put forward the fol-
lowing statement:22
In contrast to the recent studies for wheat and a bundle of major
grains, respectively, variations in protection levels here are
explained by qualitative variables (indicating structural pecu-
liarities) at the expense of the structural variables.
1. NPCs appeared to be above average in the years 1970 to 1972
(when world market prices were very low) and below average
during the world food crisis (which caused a commodity price
boom). These findings support the view that policy makers in
developing countries tend to stabilize producer prices in the
presence of volatile world market prices.
2. Protection levels are higher in more developed countries (Ko-
rea, Malaysia, Turkey, Mexico) than in less developed coun-
tries, i.e. the former are more able to give price incentives
to domestic farmers.
3. The degree of self-sufficiency does not account for variations
in NPCs. This might be explained by the fact that governments
in developing countries focus on the provision of cheap food
to urban consumers and cannot at the same time afford to sup-
port producer prices because of budgetary constraints. For
some countries (India, Indonesia, Philippines) the evidence
suggests that their striving for self-sufficiency is promoted
by other measures than price supports (e.g. fertilizer sub-
sidies) .
For net-exporting countries the main results are:
1. Low export shares correspond to high protection levels. The
following facts contribute to this outcome: Firstly, Japan
protects domestic farmers strongly and at the same time has
low export shares. Secondly, developing countries with high
export shares (e.g. Thailand) tax rice exports substantially
in order to raise revenues. And thirdly, the industrial coun-
tries with high export shares (USA, Spain, Australia, Italy)
do not systematically promote exports to defend world market
shares.23
2. Rice price protection rises with an increasing level of eco-
nomic development, a result being consistent with a priori
theorizing and recent empirical evidence.
3. The explanatory power of the model is enormously improved, if
one accounts for Japan's large deviations from average protec-
tion levels. This exceptional position is similar for wheat
and rice, respectively, although Japan is a net importer of
wheat and a net exporter of rice, which would suggest differ-
ent policies in both cases.
Altogether, this study has confirmed the view that it is neces-
sary to focus the analysis on individual agricultural goods,
because there may be differences in the structure of protection
between commodities, which are obscured in an aggregate approach
for total agriculture. This is underlined by the inconsistencies
between the wheat and rice sector referring to the effect of
import-dependence on protection levels.
Notes
The comparative advantage of the agricultural sector can be
proxied by the ratio of labor productivity in agriculture to
labor productivity in industry (productivity ratio) or by the
ratio of agricultural land area per farm worker to average
capital endowment per worker (factor ratio). Since time
series data on this subjects are not completely available,
the variable is omitted here. Honma and Hayami [1986] ob-
tained a significant negative relationship between this var-
iable and agricultural protection within a cross-section
analysis for 10 industrial countries.
Generally, Effective Protection Coefficients (EPCs) should be
used to measure protection on the production side. However,
NBCs for rice are very close to EPCs, since secondary inputs
are not important in rice production (Gotsch and Brown
[1980], Scandizzo and Bruce [1980]). Insofar, it does not
matter, whether one takes NPCs or EPCs as a measure of pro-
tection.24
3. Some socialist countries, which are important rice producers
(China, P.R., Laos, Kampuchea, Democratic Republic of Korea,
Vietnam), are missing in the sample due to a lack of data.
4. The efforts to become self-sufficient have been quite suc-
cessful in Asia. The Philippines almost reached self-suffi-
ciency at the end of the 1970s, India became a net exporter
of rice in 1979 and other nations like Indonesia, Korea and
Sri Lanka reduced their rice imports substantially during the
1970s. Indonesia, the main rice importer of the 1970s, reach-
ed self-sufficiency in 1984 (USDA [1986]).
5. The stabilization of domestic prices is usually accomplished
by placing monopoly control over imports and exports in the
hand of a logistics agency (Timmer [1988]).
6. The calculation of internal transportation costs is described
in detail in Taylor [1989, p. 32].
7. The adjustment procedure applied here is in line with Taylor
[1989, p. 30]: Food aid quantities as reported by the FAO
were multiplied by c.i.f. market prices to obtain the market
value of concessional imports. This value was subtracted from
the import value reported in the FAO Trade Statistics, the
difference being the value of commercial imports. The per
unit price of concessional imports as well as commercial
imports was then obtained by dividing the value of commercial
imports by the sum of both import quantities. In cases, where
concessional imports exceeded the imports reported in FAO
Trade Statistics, the per unit price was calculated as the
value of the reported FAO import value divided by the sum of
FAO import and concessional import quantities. This is done
under the assumption that concessional imports were not in-
cluded in the FAO Trade Statistics.
8. The insignificant coefficient of agriculture's share in total
economy is partly due to a substantial correlation with GDP
per capita (the correlation coefficient being 0.73).
9. The coefficient obtained in this study is 1.26. Honma and
Hayami [1986] estimated lower coefficients lying between 0.40
and 0.69 for an average of agricultural commodities in 10
industrial countries.
10. Another problem with agriculture's share in economy is that
it possibly changes with varying NPCs, thereby causing a si-
multaneity bias in the OLS-regression.25
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Countries above the dotted line are net-importers, countries below the line net-exporters. - Producer Prices are
taken from IRRI 11988i
Source: Own computations with data from FAO [1982] for domestic prices, FAO[b] for border prices and Taylor [1989]
as well as The World Atlas of Agriculture (1973] for internal transportation costs.29





















































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own computations with data from Appendix 1, Cowitt [19851, Pick [19781 and IMF [19811.30












































































































































































































































Source: Own computations with data from Appendix 1, Cowitt [1985], Pick [19781 and FAO [19841.31





















































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Summers and Heston [1988].32



















































































































































































































































Source: Own computations with data taken from FAO, Trade and Production Yearbooks, various years.33
























































































































































































aThe variable is introduced one-year lagged. Export shares are defined as Exports/Production*0.65.
Source: FAO, Trade and Production Yearbook, various issues.
Appendix 7 - International Terms of Trade Between Food and Manufactured Goods, 1969-1980
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1.05 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.15 1.31 1.27 1.14 1.07 1.00 1.00 1.03
Source: FAO, Trade Yearbook and UN, Statistical Yearbook, various issues.34










































































































































































































































































































































































































Due to a lack of data shares for the years 1971 to 1974 are estimated assuming a linearly decreasing agricultu-
ral sector for each country, which seems to be an acceptable approximation in view of the actual time series ob-
servations for the other years.
Source: FAO, Production Yearbook, various issues.